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Obergefell and the “New” Reproduction
Courtney Megan Cahill

†

Alternative reproduction has become the new frontier in
the continuing culture wars over the family. Commentators
with longstanding anxieties over non-traditional kinship have
turned their regulatory gaze to it, as have more progressive
scholars who support non-traditional family formation but nevertheless favor proposals to regulate the “new kinship” and the
1
2
“new reproduction.” Excavating Obergefell v. Hodges’s less obvious reproductive dimension, this Essay argues that the
Court’s landmark marriage equality decision renders these
regulatory proposals of alternative procreation constitutionally
vulnerable. It further maintains that Obergefell could transform even existing laws on procreation by eroding a distinction
on which so many of them rest: the distinction between sexual
and alternative life creation. Thus understood, Obergefell is a
case that unsettles not just the traditional underpinnings of
marriage, but also the very edifice supporting the legal regulation of intimate and family life.
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth commentators’ proposed regulations of alternative reproduction and their

† Copyright © 2016 by Courtney Megan Cahill.
1. Naomi Cahn refers to the families created by alternative reproduction
as “the new kinship.” See Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367
(2012) [hereinafter The New Kinship]. Dorothy Roberts refers to some alternative reproductive methods as “the new reproduction.” Dorothy E. Roberts, Race
and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS. L.J. 935 (1996). While some alternative reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilization, are relatively new,
others, such as surrogacy and alternative insemination, have a much longer
ancestry—one that in some cases extends back to biblical times. See generally
KARA W. SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD, MILK,
AND SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA 200–25 (2014) (providing a detailed history
of insemination with donor sperm in the 19th and early-to-mid 20th centuries); Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close
Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1107 (2002)
(“Surrogacy by natural means . . . was practiced since biblical times.”). This
author places “new” in smart quotes in order to contest what is routinely assumed, namely, the novelty of alternative reproduction and the kinship that it
helps to create.
2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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justifications for them. Part II considers the fate of those proposals after Obergefell v. Hodges, which destabilizes both traditionalist and non-traditionalist justifications for alternative reproductive regulation. Part III concludes.
I. PROPOSED REGULATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE
REPRODUCTION
A. REGULATORY PROPOSALS
Calls to regulate the practices of alternative reproduction
are sounding from diverse ideological camps and creating surprising bedfellows. On the more conservative side, David
Blankenhorn, the lead witness for Proposition 8’s supporters in
the federal trial over that amendment’s constitutionality and a
3
longtime skeptic of non-traditional kinship, opposes the indus4
try norm of gamete donor anonymity and advocates laws that
5
limit sperm bank use to married heterosexual couples. Lynn
Wardle and Marsha Garrison have embraced similar pro6
posals.
3. See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING
OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 171–84 (1995) (cataloguing and discussing the perceived costs of “sperm fatherhood”); David Blankenhorn, President,
Inst. Am. Values, The Rights of Children and the Redefinition of Parenthood
(June 2, 2005), http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/family-humanrights.pdf.
For recent scholarly treatment of Blankenhorn’s traditionalist project vis-à-vis
alternative reproduction, see Courtney Megan Cahill, The Oedipus Hex: Regulating Family After Marriage Equality, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 191, 228
(2015); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence
of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 820–22 (2014); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(on file with author).
4. Cf. David Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed,
N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012), http:///www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how
-my-view-on-gay-marriage-changed.html. Blankenhorn concludes his New
York Times Op-Ed by announcing his newfound support for same-sex marriage
and pressing individuals to reconsider whether they ought to be “denying”
children born of assisted reproductive means the right to biological
parenthood. See id. This same argument emerged in Blankenhorn’s testimony
against same-sex marriage in the Proposition 8 trial, where he testified that
children have a right to “know and be known by the two people who brought
[them] into this world.” Transcript of Proceedings, Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW). Remarks like these suggest
that alternative reproduction has become the new resting place for
Blankenhorn’s (and his Institute’s) anxiety over unconventional kinship.
5. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 233.
6. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive
Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835,
905–10 (2000); Lynn D. Wardle, Global Perspective on Procreation and Parentage by Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 453 (2006).
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Conservative commentators are not alone in turning their
regulatory eye to alternative reproduction, as progressive commentators who otherwise support alternative family formation
advocate stricter regulation of alternative reproduction. Naomi
Cahn, for instance, supports laws that eliminate donor ano7
nymity, place caps on the number of children born from any
8
individual donor, and establish “special birth certificates for
9
. . . donor conceived children.” Dov Fox advances the regulation
of a different industry norm: donor banks’ arrangement of do10
nors in race salient ways. He supports taxing banks that do
11
12
so, or subjecting them to a commercial advertising ban. Finally, Michele Goodwin supports the private regulation of alternative reproduction through the application of tort law to its
13
routine practices. Tort law, she argues, ought to regulate
“reckless [alternative] reproduction” no less than it regulates
14
“reckless driving.”
These regulatory proposals depart from the status quo,
which reflects a largely non-interventionist approach toward
15
alternative reproduction; indeed, some of them would alter its
practice in dramatic ways that are likely to have a disparate
impact on historically marginalized groups, like sexual minori16
ties. In addition, these proposals represent the position that
today dominates academic commentary on alternative reproduction. While some scholars resist the call to regulate alterna7. See, e.g., NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP: CONSTRUCTING DONORCONCEIVED FAMILIES 129 (2012); The New Kinship, supra note 1, at 413; Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National Donor
Gamete Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 203, 223 (2009).
8. See The New Kinship, supra note 1, at 412.
9. Naomi Cahn, Do Tell! The Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1077, 1104–05 (2014); see also CAHN, supra note 7, 151 (calling for such a change and explaining the legal and policy elements that support limits on a single donor sperm’s use).
10. See Dov Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
3 (2011); Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification and Assisted Reproduction, 118
YALE L.J. 1844 (2009) [hereinafter Racial Classification].
11. Racial Classification, supra note 10, at 1897.
12. Id. at 1897–98.
13. Michele Goodwin, A View from the Cradle: Tort Law and the Private
Regulation of Assisted Reproduction, 59 EMORY L.J. 1039 (2010).
14. Id. at 1054.
15. See CAHN, supra note 7, at 27 (stating that the fertility industry’s regulatory practices reflect “self-policing” rather than “top-down governance” (citing Steven Kotler, The God of Sperm: In an Industry Veiled in Secrecy, a Powerful L.A. Sperm Peddler Shapes the Nation’s Rules on Disease, Genetics—and
Accidental Incest, L.A. WEEKLY, Sept. 27, 2007)).
16. See MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES 62 (2015).
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tive reproduction, theirs, Martha Ertman writes, is “a minority
17
view.”
B. REGULATORY JUSTIFICATIONS
Some commentators support reproductive regulation for
overtly normative reasons. Blankenhorn, for instance, contends
that the government ought to eliminate gamete donor anonymity because children have a “right to know” their “biological par18
ents,” and supports limiting access to alternative insemination to married, heterosexual couples on the basis that “[i]n a
good society, people do not traffic commercially in the produc19
tion of radically fatherless children.” Wardle and Garrison
agree, arguing, respectively, that anonymous gamete donation
20
is akin to a “badge” and “incident of slavery,” and undermines
societal norms in favor of biological, dual-gendered
21
parenthood.
Less conservative scholars who favor reproductive regulation turn away from traditional family values rhetoric, and often center instead on the constitutional status of procreation.
22
They variously contend that Skinner v. Oklahoma, on its face
23
a case about equal protection rather than fundamental rights,
17. Id. at 60. For other critiques of recent proposals to regulate alternative
reproductive technologies, see Cahill, supra note 3; I. Glenn Cohen, Response:
Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymity: Of Changed Selves, Nonidentity, and
One-Night Stands, 100 GEO. L.J. 431 (2012); Martha M. Ertman, Unexpected
Links Between Baby Markets and Intergenerational Justice, 8 L. & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 271 (2014); NeJaime, supra note 3; see also Courtney Megan Cahill,
Reproduction Reconceived (Jan. 10, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author and the Minnesota Law Review) (arguing that the strong constitutional norms in favor of unregulated sexual reproduction must apply as well to
alternative reproduction given both the factual similarities between sexual
and alternative procreation and emerging constitutional principles in favor of
procreative and familial autonomy).
18. Blankenhorn, supra note 4.
19. BLANKENHORN, supra note 3, at 233.
20. Wardle, supra note 6, at 451.
21. See Garrison, supra note 6, at 905–06, 912.
22. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. Skinner held that Oklahoma’s mandatory sterilization law for particular classes of criminal offenders violated the federal Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 542–43. For scholars who argue that Skinner establishes a fundamental
right to procreate notwithstanding its equal protection holding, see Ira C.
Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV.
981, 1019 (1979); John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes,
and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1493
(2008) (“Although [Skinner] couched its decision in the language of equality
. . . the rhetoric of a liberty right to reproduce . . . explains the frequency with
which the case is now cited.”).
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“says little about the importance or value of reproduction or the
24
right to reproduce,” says nothing about whether that right in25
cludes alternative reproductive technologies, and at most prohibits the government from regulating alternative reproductive
technologies in unequal ways—not from regulating alternative
26
reproductive technologies for everyone. They also suggest that
the mechanical differences between sexual and alternative reproduction justify different constitutional treatment of them,
sometimes reasoning that “non-intimate” alternative reproduction is sufficiently distinct from “intimate” sexual reproduction
to warrant less constitutional protection—and greater regula27
tion.
Unlike the more overtly traditionalist arguments put forth
by alternative reproduction skeptics, the arguments in this latter group appear to be driven by doctrine and fact, rather than
by dogma and ideology. Even so, they ought to trouble those
who favor procreative and familial choice and who are wary of
the many emerging proposals to curtail it, emanating as they
do an air of neutrality that renders them more universally appealing—and therefore more likely to be codified as law—than
their visibly ideological cohorts.
II. OBERGEFELL ON REPRODUCTION
Obergefell destabilizes both traditionalist and nontraditionalist arguments in favor of alternative reproductive
regulation. Section A considers Obergefell’s impact on ideologically conservative arguments, that is, on those arguments that
justify reproductive regulation by underscoring the importance
of preserving the traditional nuclear family. Section B turns to
Obergefell’s effect on the more rhetorically neutral arguments
considered above, that is, on those arguments that justify reproductive regulation by focusing on the constitutional status of
procreation in general and alternative procreation in particular.
24. Goodwin, supra note 13, at 1089.
25. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 1, at 424; Fox, Racial Classification, supra
note 10, at 1882; Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1461–63 (2008).
26. Rao, supra note 25, at 1460 (“[T]he government could prohibit use of a
particular reproductive technology across the board for everyone; however,
once the state permits use in some contexts, it should not be able to forbid use
of the same technology in other contexts. Hence, all persons must possess an
equal right, even if no one retains an absolute right, to use ARTs.”).
27. Cahn, supra note 9, at 1106; Goodwin, supra note 13, at 1091–92; Fox,
Racial Classification, supra note 10, at 1882–83.
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A. TRADITIONALIST ARGUMENTS AFTER OBERGEFELL
The fate of arguments that favor reproductive regulation
for patently normative reasons is clear after Obergefell: such
arguments, and any laws they might inspire, are likely unconstitutional. Obergefell acknowledges the reality of gay
28
parenthood, including gay “biological” parenthood, and dispels
hoary stereotypes about sexual minorities as sterile pedophili29
acs prone to unfamiliar, and unfamilial, behavior. In addition,
Obergefell explicitly extends constitutional shelter to “choices
concerning . . . family relationships, procreation, and childrear30
ing.” Finally, Obergefell establishes a constitutional norm of
sexual orientation equality in marriage as well as in what it re31
fers to as the “related rights” of childrearing and procreation.
In all of these ways, Obergefell disrupts the traditionalist argument for reproductive regulation, motivated as that argument is by an impulse to promote, privilege, and replicate the
conventional nuclear family and to cast sexual minorities in
“family unfriendly” ways.
B. LESS (OVERTLY) TRADITIONALIST ARGUMENTS AFTER
OBERGEFELL
Less immediately evident is the fate of arguments that favor reproductive regulation for more rhetorically neutral, procreation-centered reasons. This Essay submits that Obergefell
unsettles those arguments no less than it upends their more
overtly ideological companions, and that it does so in three
ways. First, Obergefell suggests that procreation is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, thus complicating
regulatory proposals that derive from a belief that the Constitution extends moderate equality protection, rather than expansive liberty protection, to procreation. Second, Obergefell
suggests that constitutional parity exists between sexual and
alternative reproduction not only with respect to the right to
marry, but also with respect to the right to procreate. Third,
28. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (”[M]any same-sex
couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted.”).
29. See id. at 2596, 2600. On these stereotypes, see Franklin, supra note
3, at 829 (“For the better part of a century, stereotyped conceptions of homosexuals (particularly gay men) depicted them as sexually predatory, dangerous
to children, and antithetical to the family.”); Courtney Megan Cahill, The
Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic Perspective on the Law’s
Procreationist Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393, 460–63 (2007).
30. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
31. Id. at 2600.
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Obergefell furthers a constitutional trend away from the sex
exceptionalism that animates large swaths of the law—
including proposed and actual regulations of alternative reproduction.
1. Procreation as a Fundamental Right
Obergefell first upsets procreation-based arguments in favor of reproductive regulation by suggesting that procreation is
a constitutionally protected liberty right. Recall the argument
that Skinner v. Oklahoma at most establishes a principle of
32
“equal liberty” in reproductive matters. This more restrained
reading of Skinner avers that the Constitution prohibits the
state from passing certain laws that curb the procreative liberties of particular groups, not from passing certain laws that
curb the procreative liberties of everyone. It posits that certain
regulations of alternative reproduction, as long as they do not
target specific groups, would likely pass constitutional muster.
Obergefell renders this more modest, equality-based reading of Skinner—and the regulatory regimes that could flow
from it—problematic. Obergefell conceptualizes procreation
much in the same way that it conceptualizes marriage: as both
an equality and a liberty right. That it does so is unsurprising,
given that it acknowledges more than once the interconnectedness of marriage and procreation, calling them “relat33
ed rights” that compose a “unified whole.”
Consider first Obergefell’s description of marriage. Prior
marriage decisions either interweave equality and liberty or
34
rest exclusively on the Equal Protection Clause, leading commentators to suggest that those cases at most establish that
35
the Constitution guarantees “equal access” to marriage, not
that marriage is a fundamental right. Unlike those decisions,
Obergefell is a persistent meditation on the marriage “right.”
Obergefell refers to marriage as a form of “liberty” three times
36
in just its first paragraph, and reiterates throughout its majority opinion that marriage is a fundamental right under the
32. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 25, at 1460.
33. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
34. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978) (finding only a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 12
(1967) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
35. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Right To Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
2081, 2083 (2005) (suggesting that the state could abolish marriage without
violating due process); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and
the Right To Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1400–07 (2010).
36. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
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37

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even as it
38
observes the equality dimension of marriage, Obergefell insists that “[t]he Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
39
Clause . . . set forth independent principles” and that “[t]he
right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty
promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from
that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the
40
laws.” The adverbial “too” suggests that, for the majority,
marriage is protected as a matter of substantive due process as
well as equal protection.
Obergefell conceptualizes the constitutional status of procreation in similar terms. “[I]n Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,” Obergefell says, “the Court invalidated under both
principles [liberty and equality] a law that allowed sterilization
41
of habitual criminals.” Given the Obergefell majority’s deliberate parsing of liberty and equality as “independent principles” animating the constitutional status of marriage; given its
allusion to Skinner as a case that, like marriage, involves
“both” liberty and equality; and given its conceptualization of
marriage and procreation as “related rights,” it would not be
implausible to say that Obergefell provides an opening for what
many scholars see lacking in Skinner: a robust articulation of
42
procreation’s substantive constitutional dimension.
If that is correct, then Obergefell could unsettle arguments
favoring reproductive regulation that are predicated on an
“equal liberty” theory of procreation. In a world where procreation is not protected under substantive due process, reproductive regulation that burdens all alternative procreators is of little constitutional moment. But in a world where procreation is
a fundamental right, reproductive regulation that burdens any
alternative procreator—including mandatory donor nonanonymity regulation—raises serious constitutional concern.
2. Constitutional Parity Between Sexual and Alternative
Reproduction
Obergefell unsettles procreation-based arguments in favor
of alternative reproductive regulation for a second reason: the
37. See, e.g., id. at 2598.
38. See id. at 2602–05.
39. Id. at 2603 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 2602 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 2604 (emphasis added).
42. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 453–54 (2003).
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Court suggests constitutional parity between sexual and alternative reproduction. Recall the argument that Skinner at most
extends constitutional protection to traditional—that is, sexual—procreation. Obergefell appears to differ. First, it overrules
43
Baker v. Nelson, a case that rested implicitly on a constitutionally relevant distinction between sexual and alternative reproduction. Second, it declares that even non-traditional practices, like certain forms of alternative reproduction, receive
constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause.
Binding on courts until Obergefell, Baker held that Minnesota’s marriage exclusion did not violate the federal Constitution because marriage was necessarily procreative. “Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur44
vival of the human race,” it reasoned. Baker’s procreation rationale, which became authority for courts hearing marriage
45
claims for the next three decades, did not just link marriage
and procreation, however: it linked marriage and sexual procreation in particular—albeit without explicitly saying so.
When Baker was decided in 1971, the public was well aware of
the practice of alternative insemination, which had become not
46
47
only “popular” by the 1940s, but also legal in some states.
Courts and legislators in several states, including Minnesota,
had been wrestling with issues surrounding alternative insem48
ination for years before Baker was decided in 1971, and by
1973 the Uniform Law Commissioners had codified the trend
toward legalization of alternative insemination through the
passage of an act that legitimized alternative reproduction: the
49
Uniform Parentage Act. By the 1980s, as courts were continu43. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
44. Id. at 186 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)).
45. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wa. Ct. App. 1974)
(quoting Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186).
46. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1060.
47. See id. at 1083–97.
48. See id. at 1069 n.125.
49. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1973), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/
upa73.pdf (stating that a male donor will not be considered a father of a child
born from alternative insemination if the sperm is provided to a licensed physician for use in alternative insemination of a married woman other than the
donor’s wife). The Uniform Parentage Act was revised in 2000 (and amended
in 2002). Parentage Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www
.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited Jan.
4, 2016). Among other things, the revised UPA dispenses with the physician
assistance and marriage requirements. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002), http://www
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ing to justify same-sex marriage exclusions by adverting to pro50
creation, the commercial gamete market began to cater to lesbian women in particular, with the country’s first lesbianowned sperm bank, Pacific Reproductive Services, opening for
51
business in California in 1984.
By upholding marriage exclusions on the basis of procreation at a time when increasing numbers of sexual minorities
were procreating, Baker and its progeny signaled that marriage
was not just about procreation generally, but about sexual procreation specifically. In fact, every iteration of the procreation
rationale, from Baker’s “perpetuation of the species” rationale
to the more recent “responsible procreation” rationale rejected
52
by the Obergefell majority, assumed that the state could deny
same-sex couples the right to marry because of their inability to
procreate in a certain manner—sexually—not because of their
inability to procreate at all.
Obergefell reverses that trend by (1) rejecting all versions
53
(2) recognizing the nonof the procreation rationale,
traditional kinship often made possible by alternative repro54
duction and citing it as a reason to extend marriage to same55
sex couples, and (3) overruling Baker: “Baker v. Nelson must
56
be and now is overruled,” it declares. In all of these ways,
Obergefell renders procreative mechanics irrelevant with respect to the right to marry.
Even more, Obergefell renders procreative mechanics irrelevant with respect to the right to procreate. Obergefell states
that non-traditional practices, like same-sex marriage, may
qualify for fundamental right status under the Due Process
Clause, notwithstanding the Court’s earlier insistence in Washington v. Glucksberg that “the [Due Process] Clause specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, ob-

.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf.
50. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980)
(finding Baker to be persuasive).
51. See Why a Lesbian-Owned Bank Is a Positive Choice for Any Woman,
PAC. REPROD. SERVS., https://www.pacrepro.com/index.php?main_page=why_
prs (last visited Jan. 4, 2016). For a complete history of sperm banks’ operation in the United States, see SWANSON, supra note 1, at 198–237.
52. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
53. See id. at 2601 (rejecting perpetuation of the species rationale); id. at
2607 (rejecting responsible procreation rationale).
54. See id. at 2600.
55. See id. at 2600–01.
56. Id. at 2605.
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jectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”
In rejecting the Glucksberg approach—at least with respect to
some fundamental rights, including “marriage and intima58
cy” —and in refusing to define rights “by who exercised them
59
in the past,” Obergefell lays the foundation for establishing
complete constitutional parity between (traditional) sexual reproduction and (non-traditional) alternative reproduction—
parity, that is, with respect not just to marriage but to procreation also. If marriage and procreation are “related rights,” as
60
Obergefell insists, and if the traditional approach for determining rights under the Due Process Clause does not apply to
marriage, then it follows that the traditional approach for determining rights probably does not apply to procreation either.
3. The Demise of Sex Exceptionalism
Obergefell unsettles procreation-based arguments in favor
of alternative reproductive regulation for a third reason: by furthering a constitutional trend away from sex exceptionalism.
Defined as the idea that the uniqueness of sex warrants different, and often privileged, legal treatment of it, sex
exceptionalism pervades legal doctrine, from the regulation of
intimate agreements to the punishment of sex work, sexual as61
sault, and sexual offenders. Sex exceptionalism influenced
constitutional marriage law until Obergefell, and continues to
influence proposed—and actual—regulations of alternative re62
production.
The devolution of sex exceptionalism that arguably started
63
with Lawrence v. Texas —a case that functions as Obergefell’s
57. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997).
58. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“[W]hile [the Glucksberg] approach may
have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted
suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing
other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.”).
59. Id. at 2602 (“If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past,
then received practices could serve as their own continued justification and
new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”); see also id. at 2597
(“History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry [of identifying fundamental rights] but do not set its outer boundaries. . . . That method respects
our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present.”).
60. Id. at 2600.
61. For an examination of sex exceptionalism in these and other domains,
see Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303 (2014).
62. See generally Laura A Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and
Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809 (2010) (identifying and questioning the
law’s idealization of certain sexual relations).
63. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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64

veritable “ur-text” —continues apace in Obergefell. Lawrence
established that heterosexual intercourse is not the sine qua
non of sexual autonomy. Obergefell establishes that heterosexual intercourse is not the sine qua non of marital autonomy—
nor, arguably, of procreative autonomy. At the very least, Lawrence and Obergefell challenge justifications for reproductive
regulation that are grounded on alleged differences between
“intimate” heterosexual reproduction and “non-intimate” alter65
native reproduction. At their most radical, they decenter the
privileged status that heterosexual intercourse has long enjoyed in the law, and destabilize the panoply of existing regimes that embrace sex exceptionalism. Such regimes include,
among others, federal regulations of gamete banks and state
paternity laws, both of which create a separate set of rules for
66
sexual and alternative procreators.
CONCLUSION: OBERGEFELL’S TRANSFORMATIVE
POTENTIAL
Obergefell is a marriage case whose animating logic extends beyond marriage, and into realms like procreation and
the family. It poses an obstacle to the many emerging proposals
to regulate alternative reproduction, and throws into question
myriad existing laws that are predicated on a factual and legal
distinction between sexual and alternative reproduction. Viewing Obergefell, a case that is sure to be celebrated principally in
terms of marriage and gay rights, in the more capacious terms
suggested by this Essay helps to uncover the radical, and truly
transformative, power that it holds.

64. Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“The generations that wrote
and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions.”) with Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 575 (“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components
of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight.”).
65. See supra note 27.
66. The Food and Drug Administration burdens non-sexual gamete donation, but not sexual gamete donation, with costly testing requirements. See,
e.g., Amber D. Abbasi, The Curious Case of Trent Arsenault: Questioning FDA
Regulatory Authority over Private Sperm Donation, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1,
16 (2013). In addition, the law in every state that has addressed the legal status of sperm donors makes a distinction between sexual and alternative reproduction in the laws of parentage. See Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity
and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 701 (2008); Katharine
K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law
and Paternal Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 22–23 (2004).

